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Digest: Communities for a Better
Environment v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District
James V. Bilek
Opinion by Werdegar, J., with George, C.J., Baxter, Chin,
Moreno, JJ., and Pollak, J.1 and Premo, J.2
Issues
1. Whether a governmental agency may use the maximum
emissions allowed under a pre-existing government issued
permit as the baseline in determining if an Environmental
Impact Report is required to be produced.
2. Whether the use of the actual environmental conditions as
a baseline during the examination of a proposed project’s
environmental impact will deprive the permit holder of his or her
vested rights.
3. Whether subsequent review of the approved proposed
project will violate the permit’s statute of limitations.
4. Whether an exception should be made for a company’s
proposed project if that proposed project consists of using
equipment already installed and subject to government permits.
5. Whether a government agency must use a specific formula
in its calculation of the baseline.
Facts
Real party in interest, ConocoPhillips, operates a refinery in
Wilmington, CA, which produces chemical products such as
diesel fuel, gasoline, and jet fuel.3 The defendant, South Coast
Air Quality Management District (District), is a government
agency responsible for the regulation of “nonvehicular air

1 Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
2 Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
3 Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. 226 P.3d 985, 990
(Cal. 2010).
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pollution in the South Coast Air Basin . . . .”4 The plaintiffs
include various labor organizations, individuals who live in the
area near the refinery, and an environmental organization.5 In
order to comply with federal and state environmental regulations
mandating a reduction of sulfur content in diesel fuel,
ConocoPhillips developed a plan entitled the Ultra Low Sulfur
Diesel Fuel Project (the Diesel Project).6 Under the Diesel
Project, ConocoPhillips planned to replace certain equipment and
increase the use of four boilers it had maintained.7 These boilers
were subject to permits issued prior to the state and federal
environmental regulations and, according to the permits, were
allowed to operate at certain maximum levels.8 ConocoPhillips
sought approval from the District to obtain a new permit for the
Diesel Project.9 According to the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA), any project that may have significant
environmental effects “requires a public agency to prepare an
environmental impact report (EIR) . . . .”10 In order to determine
if a project will significantly affect the environment, the
government agency must compare the conditions of the
environment prior to the project’s implementation with the
conditions of the environment post-implementation.11
The
environment’s state prior to the project’s implementation is
referred to as the “baseline,” which consists of “the physical
environmental conditions in the vicinity of the project, as they
exist
at
the
time . . . environmental
analysis
is
commenced . . . .”12
Furthermore, CEQA guidelines permit
government agencies to publish certain threshold levels; if a
certain chemical emission surpasses that level, the proposed
project will be deemed to have a significant impact on the
environment.13 In its initial report, the District concluded that
the Diesel Project would not have a significant impact on the
environment, and thus did not require production of an EIR.14
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 989 (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21100(a), 21151(a) (West 2010)). “The
purpose of an EIR is to inform decision makers and the public of the potential
environmental impacts of a project and to identify feasible alternatives to the project and
measures to mitigate or avoid the adverse effects.” Fed’n of Hillside & Canyon Ass’ns. v.
City of L.A., 83 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1258 (2000).
11 Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 226 P.3d at 989.
12 Id. (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15125(a) (2010)).
13 Id. at 990 n.2.
14 Id. at 990.
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One of the plaintiffs’ experts opined that the Diesel Project would
greatly affect the environment by increasing nitrogen oxide
emissions to as much as 661 pounds per day.15 The District’s
published threshold for nitrogen oxide emissions is 55 pounds per
day.16 The District itself concluded the Diesel Project would
increase nitrogen oxide levels by between 237 and 456 pounds
per day, but, since the bulk of this increase—between 201 and
420 pounds per day—would be caused directly by the increased
usage of the four boilers (an increased usage within the
maximum allowed by their permits), the District regarded the
emissions output as below the 55 pounds per day threshold.17
Thus, in determining the baseline, the District argued that
because ConocoPhillips already had permits to use the boilers, its
baseline should be the level of emissions that would occur at the
boilers’ maximum permitted use.18 In their petition for writ of
mandate, plaintiffs argued that the District erred in using this as
a baseline, that substantial evidence existed to conclude that the
Diesel Project would have a significant impact on the
environment, and that the District should have prepared an EIR
to determine if any measures could be taken to mitigate the
environmental impact of the Diesel Project.19
The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ petition and entered
judgment for ConocoPhillips and the District.20 On appeal, the
Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the
proper baseline should be determined by the actual physical
conditions, as opposed to potential conditions.21 The Court of
Appeal further held that if the proper baseline had been used,
there would have been sufficient evidence to show that the Diesel
Project would have a significant impact on the environment.22
Therefore, the Court of Appeal remanded with orders that an
EIR be prepared by the District.23
The District and
ConocoPhillips petitioned the California Supreme Court for
review.24 In their argument, ConocoPhillips and the District
contended that: (1) as ConocoPhillips had an entitlement to use
its boilers at a certain level, the proper baseline should be those

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
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24

Id.
Id. at 990 n.2.
Id. at 990–91.
Id. at 991.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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emissions created by the boilers’ maximum allowable level of
usage; (2) if the maximum emissions allowed under the permit
were not used as a baseline, ConocoPhillips would be deprived of
its vested rights under the permit; (3) in allowing a challenge to
the District’s determination, the court would violate the permit’s
statute of limitations; (4) regardless of the above arguments, an
exception should have been made for ConocoPhillips because its
proposed project was simply a modification of a pre-approved
project; and (5) the Court of Appeal’s order that an average
annual emissions level be used as the baseline was improper.25
Analysis
1. What is the proper standard to establish a baseline for
purposes of determining if a proposed project will have a
significant impact on the environment?
To determine if the District used an improper baseline, the
court first turned to the relevant statutory law, particularly
section 15125(a) of the California Code of Regulations, which
states:
An EIR must include a description of the physical environmental
conditions in the vicinity of the project, as they exist at the time the
notice of preparation is published . . . . This environmental setting
will normally constitute the baseline physical conditions by which a
lead agency determines whether an impact is significant.26

The court next examined Court of Appeal decisions ruling
under this statute and concluded that they held that the proper
baseline is to be established by a determination of “actual
environmental conditions existing at the time of CEQA analysis,”
not the conditions that could exist under an existing permit.27
However, in its determination, the District used as its baseline
the emissions that would occur if the boilers were running at the
maximum capacity allowed under their permits.28 Furthermore,

Id. at 989.
Id. at 992 (emphasis omitted) (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15125(a)).
Id. at 992–93 (emphasis added) (citing Fat v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 97 Cal. App.
4th 1270, 1277–78 (2002); Envtl. Planning Info. Council v. Cnty. of El Dorado, 131 Cal.
App. 3d 350, 354, 357–58 (1982); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Bd. of Supervisors, 183 Cal.
App. 3d 229, 246–47 (1986); Cnty. of Amador v. El Dorado Cnty. Water Agency, 76 Cal.
App. 4th 931, 955 (1999); Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey Cnty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 87 Cal. App. 4th 99, 121 (2001); San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Ctr. v. Cnty. of
Merced, 149 Cal. App. 4th 645, 658 (2007); Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v.
City of Fresno, 150 Cal. App. 4th 683, 693 (2007)). These cases included factual scenarios
in which a permit or regulatory framework allowed for higher increased activity than
what was actually occurring. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 226 P.3d at 993.
28 Id. at 993.
25
26
27
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the District admitted that, normally, no one boiler ran at its
maximum capacity allowed under the permit.29 Thus, the court
held that the District erred in using as the baseline the
conditions that could exist if the boilers were simultaneously
being used at full capacity.30 The court reasoned that using the
boilers’ maximum capacity emissions is not an accurate reflection
of the established, existing, and actual environmental conditions
prior to the Diesel Project’s implementation, but is only a
hypothetical determination of what could exist at any given time
under the permits.31 By using this baseline, the court further
reasoned, the District was producing an illusory comparison that
would only serve to mislead the public and subvert the true
intentions of CEQA.32
2. Does disallowing a government agency from using the
maximum emissions allowed under a pre-existing permit as
the baseline in its CEQA analysis violate that permit
holder’s vested rights?
Despite the established case law, the District and
ConocoPhillips argued that an exception should be made because
ConocoPhillips possessed an entitlement to use the boilers at
their maximum allowable capacity under the permit.33 To rule
otherwise, according to the District and ConocoPhillips, would
deprive ConocoPhillips of its vested rights and conflict with the
permit’s statute of limitations.34 Under the doctrine of vested
rights, a property owner who has been issued a government
permit, and has substantially developed his or her property in
reliance on the permit, has a vested right to complete
construction and use the property consistent with the permit.35
The court dismissed this argument, holding that any order by the
District could not deprive ConocoPhillips of its right to use its
boilers at their maximum allowable level.36 As the court
reasoned, the issue is not whether ConocoPhillips has a right to
use its boilers at their allowable level, but rather what impact
ConocoPhillips’ proposed project, including the use of new and

29 Id. In fact, a boiler would only run at full capacity if another boiler happened to
be shut down. Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 994 (citing San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Ctr., 149 Cal. App. 4th at 658).
32 Id. (citing Envtl. Planning Info., 131 Cal. App. 3d at 538).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. (citing Russ Bldg. P’ship. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 44 Cal. 3d 839, 845–46
(1988)).
36 Id. at 995.
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modified equipment, would have on the environment.37 Even if,
using the proper baseline, the District determines that enough
adverse environmental effects will result from the Diesel Project
that it would not be approved without limits on the boilers’
emissions output, this would not deprive ConocoPhillips of a
vested right because ConocoPhillips has “no vested right to
pollute the air at any particular level.”38 Merely conditioning
approval of a new project on controlled nitrogen oxide emissions
in no way deprives ConocoPhillips of a vested right and does not
contradict the terms of its permits.39 The court also stressed that
it is always within the District’s power to simply deny permits to
be issued for the Diesel Project if it determines that nothing
could successfully mitigate the effects of the increased nitrogen
oxide production, which would clearly result in no interference
with ConocoPhillips’ rights under the permits.40 Furthermore,
even if mitigation would require interference with ConocoPhillips’ vested rights, as long as the District’s initial
investigation determined that the Diesel Project would result in
a significant environmental impact on the area, CEQA would still
require an EIR to be produced.41 Thus, the court concluded, even
if an applicant’s vested rights may be interfered with, it is not an
excuse to forgo an EIR.42
3. Does review of an order approving a proposed project
which entails the use of equipment subject to pre-existing
permits violate the statute of limitations?
ConocoPhillips and the District also argued that by allowing
judicial review of the boiler permits the courts have violated the
statute of limitations for such review, which is 30 or 180 days,
depending on the type of challenge.43
The court quickly
dismissed this argument for the same reasons stated above:
(1) plaintiffs did not challenge the previously issued boiler
permits, but rather they challenged the District’s approval of the
Diesel Project; (2) challenging the type of baseline used to assess
the Diesel Project’s environmental impact could not result in an
order interfering with the permits; and (3) even if an order were

Id. at 994.
Id. (citing Sherwin-Williams Co. v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. 86 Cal.
App. 4th 1258, 1273 (2001); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 293, 305
(1976)).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 995–96.
37
38
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given to modify the permits, that still would not preclude the
duty the District has to produce an EIR.44 The court therefore
held that the statute of limitations on the permits does not affect
the rights of the plaintiffs in this case to challenge the District’s
approval of the Diesel Project.45
4. Should an exception be made for a company’s proposed
project if it will require the use of equipment already subject
to government issued permits?
ConocoPhillips and the District argued that a long line of
Court of Appeal decisions hold that using the maximum
allowable emissions as a baseline is an exception to the general
rule of using existing conditions where the proposed project is
merely a modification of a previously approved project.46 The
court relied on the fact that the Diesel Project would require the
installation of new equipment, in addition to increased use of
existing equipment, when it held that this was not merely a
modification of a pre-existing project.47 Furthermore, ConocoPhillips applied for a new permit, and the District treated the
project as a new one that was not exempt under the California
Code of Regulations.48
5. What is the proper method to accurately calculate the
baseline to be used during CEQA analysis?
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of how to properly
calculate the baseline.49 ConocoPhillips disagreed with the Court
of Appeal ruling that required the District to use the annual
average nitrogen oxide emission level as its baseline.50 The court
turned to the CEQA guidelines in section 15125, which state:
“[T]hat the lead agency ‘normally’ use a measure of physical
conditions ‘at the time the notice of preparation [of an EIR] is
published, or if no notice of preparation is published, at the time
environmental analysis is commenced.’”51
The court expressed concern about using a rigid date for

Id. at 996.
Id.
Id. For a discussion on the applicability of the rule which ConocoPhillips argued
should apply here, see Bloom v. McGurk, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 914, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting that where a new permit involves no change in operations “the project falls
squarely within [CEQA’s] categorical exemption”).
47 Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 226 P.3d at 996.
48 Id. See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 21166, 15162, 15301 (2010).
49 Cmtys. for a Better Env’t., 226 P.3d at 997.
50 Id.
51 Id. (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15125(a)).
44
45
46
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establishing the baseline because conditions will often change
and emissions may fluctuate rapidly.52 Additionally, according to
the Court, using a rigid date may encourage companies to
artificially increase their emissions use in order to establish a
higher baseline during the review process.53 Ultimately, the
court relied on the absence of CEQA guidelines mandating a
precise formula be used to determine that the District (or other
responsible governmental agency) has discretion to determine
how the proper baseline should be calculated, as long as it is
supported by “substantial evidence.”54 The court ordered that the
District is not necessarily to use any exact formula, but in
whatever formula it does use, it must compare the existing
environmental conditions before the Diesel Project with the
environmental conditions after the Diesel Project.55
Holding
The court affirmed the Court of Appeal.56 The court held
that maximum emissions limits allowed under a permit do not
constitute a proper baseline.57 Next, the court held that a
company is not deprived of its vested rights under a permit it
holds by an order to mitigate emissions created by a proposed
project.58 A review of a proposed project, even if that review
determines the project should be denied, in no way will affect any
vested rights in pre-existing permits.59 Additionally, as the
proposed project will require the installation of new equipment,
the proposed project is not simply a modification of a prior
implemented project and thus is not subject to an exception to
the rule that an EIR be produced for any new project that will
significantly affect the environment.60 Finally, the court held
that an EIR must be produced because the Diesel Project will
likely significantly affect the environment.61 As long as the
District compares existing environmental conditions with those
after implementation of the proposed project, however, it is in the

52 Id. (citing Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 87
Cal. App. 4th 99, 125 (2001)).
53 Id. at 997.
54 Id. at 997–98.
55 Id. at 998.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 993.
58 Id. at 995.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 996.
61 Id. at 992.
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District’s discretion to determine how the baseline should be
calculated.62
Legal Significance
The Court’s decision prevents a governmental agency from
using the maximum emissions allowed under a permit as the
baseline in its determination of whether or not an EIR is to be
produced. Thus, governmental agencies must use actual existing
environmental conditions when determining whether an EIR
need be produced. The mere fact that a company has a right to
produce a certain level of emissions under an existing permit
does not mean it has the right to produce a comparable level of
emissions in a new project. The two projects are distinct, and
any government agency contemplating the production of an EIR
must treat them accordingly.

62

Id. at 998.

